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ably be required to -pay the repair bill in order to minimize
the damages.
It also appears from a finding of the trial court, which is
amply supported by the evidence, that plaintiff attempted
and was unable to obtain the use of a substitute truck while
his truck was being repaired. [9] Certainly he was' not
required to yield to defendant company's demand that he
release it from all liability in order to minimize the damages
resulting from its tortious act. Thus, it cannot be said that
plaintiff did not act with the care and diligence. to be expected of the ordinarily prudent man under similar circumstances.
[10] Defendants finally contend that the trial court erred
in permitting plaintiff to amend his complaint after the case
was submitted, and in refusing to set aside the submission in
order to permit them to plead to the amended complaint and
offer further evidence on the issues tendered thereby. They
argue that the amendment changed the cause of action from
one of tort to one of breach of contract, that the alleged contract to repair the truck set forth in the amendment was entered into without authority of defendant company, and that
the cause of action based upon breach of contract was barred
by the statp.te of limitations. The original complaint which
set forth a cause of action based upon defendants' negligence
alleged that defendant company agreed to repair the truck
at its expense. In their answers, defendants denied that they
were negligent or that defendant company agreed to repair
the truck. The amendment to the complaint realleged defendants' negligence and, in conformity with the proof, set
forth with greater particularity the company's agreement to
repair the truck. The amendment did not change the cause
of action, and it was authorized by section 470 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. (Andrus v. Smith, 133 Cal. 78, 81 [65
P. 320] ; Burrows v. Burrows, 18 Cal.App.2d 275, 278 [63 P.
2d 1135].) The trial court therefore did not err in permitting
plaintiff to amend his complaint to conform to the proof.
[11] Nor did it err in refusing to set aside submission of
the case to allow defendants to plead to the amended complaint and offer additional evidence. When an amendment
~o a complaint is properly filed to conform to proof, the
l~SUes tendered thereby are deemed denied without pleading
SlDce they already have been tried. (Glougie v. Glot£gie, 174
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Cal. 126, 132 [162 P. 118]; McDougald v. Argonaut Land
etc. 00., 1170a1. 87, 95 [48 P.1021].) The issues presented
by the amendcd complaint were raised by the pleadings prior
to the amendment, and defendants had ample opportunity
to, and did, offer evidence thereon during the course of the
trial.
'
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer; J.,
and Spence, J., pro tem., concurred.

[L. A. No. 18365.

In Bank.
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KATE H. HANNAH, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J. W.C.
POGUE et al., Appellants; THE REGENTS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA (a Corporation),
Cross-Defendant and Respondent.
KATE H. HANNAH, Respondent, v. J. W. C. POGUE et al.,
Appellants. (Two Cases.)
[1] Advorse Possession-Prescriptive Title to Easement--User.The scope of a prescriptive easement is determined by the use
through which it is acquired. A person using the land of another for the prescriptive period may acquire the right to continue such use, but does not acquire the right to make other
uses of it.
[2] Easements-Mode and Extent of User-Loeation.-If an easement is acquired by grant in a given location in the servient
tenement, it becomes fixed by use and its location may not be
substantially changed.
[3a,3b] Waters-Easements in Regard to Use of Water-Changes.
-A person having the right to maintain a dam and ditch on
the hmd of another has no right to change their locations by
[1] See 1 Cal.Jur. 597; 17 Am.Jur. 993.
[3] See 26 Cal.Jut. 165.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Adverse Possession, § 125; [2,4]
EalJemcnts, §30; [3] Waters, §249; [5J Waters, §217; [6,7]
Boundaries, § 55(5); [8J Boundaries, § 59; [9] Injunctions, § 14;
.
(10J Easements, § 53; [11] Witnesses, § 297(4);
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[8]
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the construction of a new dam and a connecting channel on
other portions of the land, although the new dam may constitute no greater burden than the previous one, hnd although
the extension to the original ditch is placed in the channel of
a river.
Easements-Mode and Extent of User-Location-Changes.There is no right to change the location of an easement over
the land of another, even if it would cause no harm to the
owner or would actually benefit him.
Waters-User of Water Rights-Dams-Trial and Relief.In an action to enjoin the maintenance of a dam across a river
running through plaintiff's property, a decree preventing defendants from constructing a dam except at a specified site
should be construed to allow them to do whatever is necessary
to such construction, including the right to tie the aam into
the shore. And where the judgment establishes defendants'
right to extend the dam so far as is necessary to meet one
shore of the river, the judgment should not be construed as
denying a comparable right if the opposite shore receded.
Boundaries - Establishment - Evidence -Sufficiency-Agreement.-An agreement establishing a boundary line when the
true line is uncertain or disputed, may be inferred from the
long-standing acceptance of a fence as a boundary between
the lands of two owners.
Id.-Establishment-Evidence-Sufficiency-Agreement.-The
testimony of one of two adjoining land owners that a fence
was in existence when her husband acquired the property
many years previously, and that she believed the fence marked
the boundary unt~l she le.arned that the other owner had employed a surveyor to determine the boundary, established her
acceptance of the fence as the boundary; and her further testimony that she knew of no agreement that the fence should
constitute the boundary did not necessarily rebut the inference
that there was such an agreement, where such inference could
be made from the long-standing acceptance of the fence as the
boundary.
Id.-Establishment-Judgment-Location of Boundary Line.Where the monument described in a judgment as markin(t
a boundary was a stake and iron pin which a deputy county
surveyor testified he removed before judgment, the judgment
was reversed with directions to re-establish the stake and
pin so that the boundary line might be made certain.
Injuncti~~s-:-Matters Controllable-Acts Completed.-A judgment enJOInIng defendants from taking dirt or branches from

[9J See 14 Cal.Jar. 209.

Mar. 1944]

HANNAH V. POGUE

851

[23 C.2d 849]

plaintiff's land violates the rule that an injunction is .ordered
against past acts only if there is evidence that they w~ll probably recur, where there is evidence that on tw~ occaSIOns one
defendant took dirt and branches, but no eVldence .that he
intends to continue doing so.
[10] Easements _ Remedies_Injunction-Dec.lar.at,ory Relief.-A
defendant having a right of way over plamttf'f s property was
improperly enjoined from entering said l.and wher~ t~e;e was
no evidence that he had .ever entered Without plalI1td'f s consent or that he intended to do so. In the absence of such
evid~nce a claim of right to enter at points other than those
that the' court designated in locating his easement. s~ould. be
determined by declaratory relief rather than by InJunction.
[11] Witnesses-Determination of Credibility-Right to l?isregard
Uncontradicted Testimony.-Where there was no e~Idence of
damaO'e resulting from plaintiff's wrongful obstruction of defenda~t's easement on plaintiff's land other than de~endant's
. testimony that he was convinced that the cost o~ hIS ope~a
tions on the land had been increased about one-thIrd, t~e t1'l~1
court was justified in regarding this testimony as unrelIable 1ll
view of the interest of the witness.
APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Tula:e
County. Andrew R. Schottky, Judge assigned. Affirmed m
part and reversed in part with directions.
Actions to quiet title and for injunctive relief.J~dgm;en~
for plaintiff affirmed in part and reversed in part WIth directions.
McFadzean & Crowe for Appellants.
Conley, Conley & Conley, W. M. ~onley, Phi1ipC0111~i,
Mathew Conley and Calkins, Hall, Lmforth .& Coriard .fo,r
Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff Mrs. Kate H. Hannah is the
owner of approximately a section of land in Tulare County
subject to a $50,000 mortgage hel? by the Regents of. the
University of California.. Through It runs the Kaweah RIve:,
from which defendant Harley Smith has for many years dIverted water by means of a dam located on plaintiff's land
and a ditch known as the Hamilton Di~ch, wh~ch also runs
through plaintiff's property. The Hamilton DItch has been
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in use since about 1860, and the, trial court found that the
da~ has becn in use for ovex: twcnty years. The dam in
eXIstence before 1920 was built of rock, but in that year it
was replaced by ~ cement dam on the same site. By 1925 the
latter had sunk mto the sand of the river bed and was replaced by another cement dam on the same site. In 1928 and
1929 de~endant J. W. C. Pogue purchased the land served
by t~e dItch and entcred into a contract to purchase the ditch
and Its appurtenances.
In 1936 the river washed round the north end of the dam.
Defendant Pogue then entered plaintiff's land and repaired
the. da.m with dirt a~d branches from the surrounding area.
PlaI.n~Iff brought SUIt and obtained it temporary order restrammg defendant from entering plaintiff's property. After
defendant agr~e~ to ~ake no more materials from plaintiff's
p~operty, the mJunctIOn was modified by stipulation to permIt defendant to enter and repair the dam. Defendant thereaft~r !lIed a c~o~s-complaint in this proceeding, asking that
plamtIff be enJomed from interfering with certain rights of
wa~ to the dam over plaintiff's land. The University of
Cal:fornia was joined as cross-defendant to this cross-complamt.
Early in 1937 the Kaweah River again washed round the
north end. ?f the dam, doubling the width of the channel
~nd deposltm~ a lar?"e sand bar in front of the ditch. Early
m 1938 the rIver WIdened the channel still more. Through
1937 defend~nt Pogue made no attempt to extend the dam
t? the OpposIte bank of the river, but obtained water by cuttmg ~he ditch through the sand bar to the river and by
pumpmg water into the ditch. In 1938 he constructed a new
dam of rock some distance upstream from the old cement
dam. The old dam was placed squarely across the river its
wall ?erpend~cular to the banks, so that it forced water into
t~e dltC? by Impounding it at a level higher than the bottom
of the dItch.. The new rock dam was placed at an acute angle
a:ross the rIver, so that the end that touched the bank opposIte the mouth of the ditch was farther upstream than the end
~earest th~ mouth. The current of the river was thus directed
mto the dItch, which had been extended upstream to the site
of the new dam. The downstream end of the new dam was
about 185 feet upstream from the south end of the old cement
dam; the upstream end was about 950 feet above the point
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where the old dam would have touched the bank of the river
had it been extended that far.
'
On June 19, 1D39, plaintiff brought suit to enjoin the maintenance of the new dam and the channel running thereto
from the Hamilton Ditch. A quiet title suit was also pending between plaintiff and defendant to settle a controversy
over the ownership of land arising out of the erosion caused
by the river's washing round the northern end of the dam.
The eroded land is near the boundary between section 7;
largely owned by plaintiff, and section 8, at least the eastern
part of which is being purchased by defendant Pogue. There
is an old fence running from north to south in this neighborhood of the disputed boundary. The monument that once
marked the north corner of these sections no longer exists and
surveyors differed in their testimony as to where it had probably been located.
On August 21, 1939, plaintiff brought suit to quiet title
to the disputed triangle of land along the boundary. On
August 19, 1939, plaintiff brought suit to enjoin the maintenance of certain levees by defendant Pogue. These suits,
together with the original action by plaintiff against defendant Pogue to enjoin defendant from entering plaintiff's
lands, and defendant's cross-complaint in that action, were
joined for trial. They were tried by the court, findings of
fact and conclusions of law were made and judgment was
entered. Defendants Pogue and Smith were enjoined from
entering plaintiff's land except over designated rights of way;
plaintiff was enjoined from interfering with those easements;
defendants were required to remove t4e new dam and to fill
in the ditch running from the dam to the former mouth of
the Hamilton Ditch. Defendants were enjoined from maintaining any dam, except on the site of the concrete dam as
extended to the opposite shore, and from maintaining a ditch
on plaintiff's land except along the line where the Hamilton
Ditch had run, meeting the Kaweah River about 20 to 30
feet above the concrete dam. In the quiet title action the
court determined that the boundary followed the old fence,
thus establishing that the erosion at the north end of the rock
dam was on plaintiff's lana. While defendants object to the
location at which the trial court placed a right of way for
them to the dam on the north side of the river, the trial court
granted a new trial as to this issue, so that it is not now

"
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before the court. As to the location of the other rights of
way, there is no objection by either party. Defendants appeal from the judgments set forth above. Plaintiff takes no
appeal from these judgments or from the judgment denying
her an injunction against the maintenance of the levees mentioned above.
The principal dispute between plaintiff and defendants
concerns the defendants' claim of a right to change the site
of the dam and ditch. Defendants contend that the scope
of their easement has been too narrowly determined, and
that the construction of the new dam upstream and of a connecting channel was within the scope of their right to repair
and improve their easement. It must be assumed that their
easement is based on prescription, for the proof was not that
the right was granted, but that these facilities had been maintained for the prescriptive period. [1] The scope of a prescriptive easement is determined by the use through whieh
it is acquired. A person using the land of another for the
prescriptive period may acquire the right to continue such
use, but does not acquire the right to make other uses of it.
(Vestal v. Young, 147 Cal. 715 [82 P. 381]; North Fork
Water 00. v. Edwards, 121 CaL 662 [54 P. 69]; Oliver v.
Agasse, 132 Cal. 297 [64 P. 401] ; Allen v. San Jose Land &
W. 00., 92 Cal. 138 [28 P. 215, 15 L.R.A. 93] ; Pacific Gas &
E. 00. v. Orockett L. & O. 00., 70 Cal.App. 283 [233 P. 370] ;
Felsenthal v. Warring, 40 Cal.App. 119 [180 P. 67]; see
White Bros. & Orum 00. v. Watson, 64 Wash. 666 [117 P.
497, 44 L.R.A.N.S. 254] ; 3 Tiffany, Real Property [3d ed.)
334; 28 C.J.S. 763.) [2] Likewise if an easement is acquired by grant in a given location in the servient tenement
it becomes fixed by use and its location may not be substan:
tially changed. (Kern Island Irrigating 00. v. Oity oj
Bakersfield, 151 Cal. 403 [90 P. 1052] j F'elsenthal v. Warring, supraj Evangelical etc. Home v. Buffalo Hydraulic
Assoc., 64 N.Y. 561, see Ward v. City of Monrovia, 16 Cal.
2d 8~5 [108 P.2d 425].) .Thus, in Vestal v. Young, supra,
and m F'elsenthal v. Warnng, supra, it was held that a person having the right to maintain a ditch in the land of another cannot substantially change the route of the ditch. (See,
also, Kern Island Irrigating Oo.v. Bakersfield, supra.) In
the Evangelical Home case, supra, it was held that a person
having the right to maintain a dam cannot change its loea-
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tion, and in White Bros. & Orum Oompany v. Watson, supra,
it was held that a person with a right to divert water through
a ditch in the land of another has no right to replace the
ditch with a dam and a flume elsewhere on the land, even
though changes in the natural conditions make effective diversion impossible except by such means.
[3a] Defendants have not shown that they or .thei~ predecessors in interest ever maintained a dam and ditch m locations other than those occupied by the old concrete dam and
the ditch. ,They have thus shown no rig?t by presc:r:ip~io~
or otherwise to make any use of the remamder of plamtIff s
land and the trial court properly restricted them to the site
previously occupied. Otherwise they would have had a floating easement enabling them to maintain a dam wherever they
chose along the length of the river on plaintiff's lan~,pre
venting plaintiff from selling any of the land bordermg on
the river free of the easement. Defendants contend that the
new dam constitutes no greater burden than the previous one.
[4] There is no right, however, to change the location of
an easement over the land of another, even if it would cause
no harm to the owner or would actually benefit him. (Vestal
v. Young, supra, at 719; see Allen v. San Jose Land & W.
00., supra, at 141.)
[3b] Defendants contend that the extensio~ ~ the Ham~l
ton Ditch is permissible on the ground that It 18 placed m
the channel of the river. The evidence shows that it was
excavated in dry land on plaintiff's property, and it is immaterial whether that land be regarded as the dry bed of the
river or the dry bank, for under the principles set forth
above defendants may not thus appropriate plaintiff's prop~
erty. Defendants rely on the early case of Ware v. ~alke,.,
70 Cal. 591 [12 P. 475]. In that case a, gravel bar mth~ ,
bed of an arroyo built up by freshets prevented the water
therein from reaching the head of Ware's ditch. It was held
that Ware had the right to remove obstructions to the flow
of the stream and did not exceed his right when he cut a channel through the bar and constructed a w:ing dam to divert
water into the channel. Defendants, however, are not seek~
ing to cut through the bar built in front, ot .the old head
of their ditch, a right that has never been demed them" but
to replace the dam they once maintained with a new dam
working on different principles, at a different site, and to
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connect that dam with thcir ditch by maintaining a 187-foot
channel on plaintiff's land bchind and paralleling the sand
bar. Nothing in thc Ware case authorizes such alterations
in established easemcnts.
[5] It is contended that the decree preventing defendants
from constructing a dam except at the former site makes it
impossible for them to construct any dam, for they are authorized only to build a dam to the shore but not to tie it
into the shore. The jUdgment allowing them to build t1.e
dam, however, should be construed to allow them to do whatever is necessary to such construction, including the right
to tie the dam into the shore. It is also contended that since
the judgment authorizes construction of a dam from the old
site to the north shore, it does not authorize extensions in case
the river works its way round the south shore of the dam.
The language in question, however, appears to anticipate
the possibility that a dam on the old site, no longcr than the
old dam, would touch the south shore but not the north. This
language establishes that defendants still have the right, frequently exercised in the past, to extend the dam so far as is
necessary to meet the north shore. It should not be construed
as denying a comparable right if the south shore receded.
[6] Defendants appeal also from the jUdgment that the
boundary between plaintiff's land and defendants' land is
the old fence. The trial court found that about the year
1917 the owners of these lands agreed that the fence should
be the boundary. Defendants contend that there is no evidence of such an agreement, and that in any event it could
not be given effect unless the boundary were uncertain, or
disputed. It is the rule, however, that the court may infer
that there was such an agreement ensuing from uncertainty
or a dispute, from the long-standing acceptance of a fence
as a boundary between the lands of two owners. (Roberts
v. Brae, 5 Ca1.2d 356 [54 P.2d 698] ; Vowinckel v. N. Clark
&- Sons, 217 Cal. 258 [18 P.2d 58] ; Moniz v. Peterman, 220
Cal. 429 [31 P.2d 353] ; Board of Trustees v. Miller, 54 Cal.
App. 102 [201 P. 952] ; Todd v. Wallace, 25 Cal.App.2d 459
[77 P.2d 877] ; Perich v. Ma.urer, 29 Cal.App. 293 [155 P.
471] ; Swartzbaugh v. Sargent, 30 Cal.App.2d 467 [86 P.2d
895] ; Southern Oounties Gas 00. v. Eden, 118 Cal.App. 582
[5 P.2d 654] ; Raney v. Merritt, 73 Cal.App. 244, 250 [238
P. 767] ; see Park v. Powers, 2 Ca1.2d 590, 599 [42 P.2d 75] ;
Clapp v. Ohurchill, 164 Cal. 741, 746 [130 P. 1061]; see 14
Cal.L.Rev. 138.)
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[7] Mrs. Hannah testified that the fence was ~n exist~nce
when her husband acquired the property, that It remamed
standing down to the time of the trial, and that she believed
it marked the boundary until she learned that defendant
Pogue had employed a surveyor to determine the boundary.
This testimony establishes her acceptance of the fence as
the boundary, .in all likelihood reflecting t~e belief of her
husband and former owners on the other SIde of the fence.
She also testified that she knew of no agreement that the
fence should constitute the boundary. This testimony does
not necessarily rebut the inference that there was 'such an
agreement, however, for the inference may be made that an
agreement was inherent in the long-standing acceptance of
the fence as the boundary. (Roberts v. Brae, supra, at 359;
Vowinckel v. N. Clark &- Sons, supra, at 260; Moniz v. Peterson, supra, at 435; Board of Trustees v. Mfller, supra, at 105;
Southern Oounties Gas 00. v. Eden, 118 Cal..App. 582, 586
[5 P.2d 654] ; see 14 Cal.L.Rev. 138.) The courts have recognized such boundaries because the early surveys in the state
were most uncertain, and in later years the monuments and
landmarks they described could not be found. (See Loeb,
The Establishment of Boundary Lines by Practical Location,
4 Cal.L.Rev. 179.) In the present case the boundary lines
could not be ascertained from the early surveys, for the monument determining the northern end of the boundary and
most of the other landmarks cannot be found. Given the
difficulties of fixing the boundaries anew according to the
.old surveys, the trial court properly recognized a line that
has served for many years as the practical boundary.
The trial court decided that this boundary was settled b,
agreement in 1917, apparently because this year marked the
acquisition of the property by the Hannahs and their acceptance of the fence as a boundary. It is unnecessary to
decide whether on this evidence the agreement can be assigned to this particular date, for the precise date of agreement is immaterial in view of the acceptance of the fence as
a boundary over a long period of years.
[8] Defendants contend that the description in the judgment of the location of the fence lacks definiteness. Part of
the section was surveyed by the federal government,' but part
was swamp and overflowed land first surveyed by the
county surveyor after the land was granted by the federal
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government to the state. The federal survey defhled the
eastern boundary from its southern end t6 the point where
it met the swamp and overflowed area; the county survey
defined the rest of the boundary. The boundary from that
point northerly to the intersection of the fence with the
northern line of the section was regarded as marked by the
fence. The monument described as marking the point wherf!
the fence met the edge of the swamp and overtlowed area was
a 2" by 2" stake and iron pin which the deputy county surveyor testified he removed before judgment. Since the judgment ties the fence as the boundary line to the stake and pin
as established before removal, it must be reversed with directions to re-establish the stake and pin so that the boundary
line may be made certain.
[9] The third judgment from which defendants appeal
fixes the locations of defendants' easements. Defendants were
enjoined from entering plaintiff's property except by route
of designated easements, and from taking dirt or branches
from plaintiff's land. The latter part of the judgment violates the rule that an injunction is ordered against past acts
only if there is evidence that they will probably recur. (Ball
v. Kehl, 87 Cal. 505 [25 P. 679J; Blackmore Inv. (]o. v.
Johnson, 213 Cal. 148 [1 P.2d 978] ; Thome v. Honcut Dredging Co., 43 Cal.App.2d 737 [111 P.2d 368) ; see 32 C.J. 46;
cases collected 14 Cal.Jur. 209.) There was evidence that
on two occasions defendant Pogue took dirt and branches.
There was no evidence that he intended to continue doing so.
[10] Defendant Smith was improperly enjoined from entering plaintiff's land, for there was no evidence that he had
ever entered without plaintiff's consent, or that he intended
to do so. While he claimed the right on the pleadings to
enter at points other than those that the court later designated in locating his easement, such a claim should be determined by declaratory relief rather than by injunction. This
judgment is therefore reversed insofar as it enjoins defendants from taking dirt and branches and enjoins defendant
Smith from entering, with directions to declare that Smith
has the right to enter only over the easements that it declares
to be on the north and south sides of the river. In other respects this judgment is affirmed.
[11] Defendant Pogue contends that the trial court erred
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in refusing him damages for the obstruction of his rights
of way. The trial court found that plaintiff had wrongfully
obstrueted his easement, to his loss, but was .unable to de~er
mine the amount of damage. The only testImony regardmg
that issue was that of defendant Pogue, limited to .the general statement that he was convinced the cost of his operations had been increased about one-third. The total cost of
repairing and maintaining the dam was about $8~500. I~
contending that Pogue's testimony should. be admItted, h~s
attorney stated that this figure was an est1m~te, and that It
was impossible to show the loss of any spec~fic amount on
any specific occasion. There was no other eVlde~ce of. damage, and the trial court was justified in regardmg th~s testimony as unreliable in view of the interest of the wlt~ess.
(Caldwell v. Weiner, 203 Cal. 543 [264 P. 1110]; DavM v.
Judson, 159 Cal. 121, 128 [113 P. 147] ; Blanc v. Connor, 167
Cal. 719, 723 [141 P. 217]; Lejeune v. General Petroleum
Corp., 128 Cal.App. 404 [18 P.2d 429].)
.
The judgments are affirmed in part and reversed m part
as set forth above, with costs to be borne by appellant.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J.,
and Schauer, J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 27,
1944.

[L. A. No. 18685. In Bank. Mar. 29, 1944.]

EDW ARD M. JONES, Respondent, v. INDEPENDENT
TITLE COMPANY et al., Defendants; RAE L. SIN·
CLAIR, Appellant.
[1] liortgages-Priority-Recordation.-A bona fide mortgagee
of real property without notice of a prior trust deed, recor~ed

subsequent to the recordation of the mortgage, holds an Incmnbrance on the land superior to that of the trustee under
the trust deed.
[1] See 18 Cal.Jur. 112; 25 Oal.Jur. 822; '36 Am.Jur. 793.
McK. Dig. References: [lJ Mortgages, § 213; [2J Vendor and
Purchaser, § 369(2).

